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In standard models of decision making, participation in violent political action is un-
derstood as the product of instrumentally rational reasoning. According to this line of
thinking, instrumentally rational individuals will participate in violent political action
only if there are selective incentives that are limited to participants. We argue in favor
of an alternate model of political violence where participants are motivated by moral
commitments to collective sacred values. Correlative and experimental empirical evi-
dence in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict strongly supports this alternate
view.
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Introduction
Why do individuals sacriﬁce their own self-
interest to participate in violent collective ac-
tions? Participation is costly and risky to the
individual, and collective success leads to in-
discriminate collective beneﬁts. For example,
if collective action secures the independence
of an oppressed national group, all members
of the group beneﬁt equally. Thus, from the
perspective of individual-level instrumental ra-
tionality, the most effective strategy is to take a
“free ride”1 on the actions of others1 unless par-
ticipants are offered “selective incentives”2–4
where contributors to collective actions accrue
private or selective beneﬁts that are additional
to the public beneﬁts of a successful rebellion.
This perspective does not ignore the impor-
tance of ideology5 but characterizes a high level
of commitment to ideology as a willingness to
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delay selective rewards to the future when vic-
tory is obtained.6
The focus of our research program has been
to investigate the extent to which this type of
cost–beneﬁt decision making characterizes vi-
olent intergroup conﬂicts. Our ﬁndings sug-
gest that decisions in these types of conﬂicts
are more akin to intuitive moral decision mak-
ing (“is this mandated or prohibited?”) than to
utility maximization. In one line of research
we have investigated what happens when peo-
ple cognitively transform issues under dispute
into sacred values, values to which they de-
clare a moral commitment that precludes ma-
terial trade-offs. For instance, this may happen
when people transform land from a fungible re-
source into “holy land.”We have demonstrated
that people in such cases often resist any at-
tempts to balance a compromise over such val-
ues with material incentives. Moreover, opposi-
tion to compromise over sacred values actually
increases in response to materially improved
offers.7 However, a purely symbolic (but often
difﬁcult and painful) act by the counterpart,
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such as an apology for past wrongs, can induce
greater willingness to compromise.7–9
In this paper we report the results of research
investigating themotivations of individuals who
take part in violent collective actions. As noted
in the opening, the dominant model assumes
that such participation is motivated by selective
private incentives. According to this approach,
while many people might be outraged by, for
example, a violation of their sacred value, those
who participate in violent collective reaction
will do so because they expect to receive pri-
vate beneﬁts later. Thus, individuals participate
in collective action in response to salient offers
of private beneﬁts that disproportionately mo-
tivate them compared to nonparticipating sup-
porters. We argue to the contrary and present
empirical evidence to support our case that par-
ticipation is more a function of “parochial al-
truism”10,11 or collective commitment than se-
lective incentives. Before discussing our own
data, we brieﬂy review the existing empirical
evidence.
Empirical Evidence: The Selective
Incentives Hypothesis
Those who stress the important role of per-
sonal instrumental incentives to collective ac-
tions often point to aggregate data that seem to
show that individual “greed” trumps collective
“grievances” as a cause of civil war. On one
hand, proxies for typical causes of ideological
grievances, including income inequality, politi-
cal inequality, ethnic divisions, and religious di-
visions, do not do an adequate job of explaining
the cross-country likelihood of civil war.12 On
the other hand, cross-country comparisons re-
veal a negative relationship between per capita
income and the likelihood of ethnic or civil war
and that lower rates of gross domestic product
(GDP) growth, coupled with increased oppor-
tunities of looting, increases the likelihood of
civil war onset.13 The implication is that high
levels of material needs (indicated by low GDP
growth) coupled with incentives to satisfy those
needs (indicated by opportunity for looting) are
consistent with some of the premises identiﬁed
above—salient selective incentives and the mo-
tivation to obtain those incentives appear to
explain why some places see more conﬂict than
others. There is equivocal evidence that this
relationship might be mirrored at the individ-
ual level. MacCulloch reports analysis of mi-
crolevel data sets that show a negative relation-
ship between an individual’s relative income
level within a country and his or her desire for
revolution.14
However, two shortcomings of this evidence
are apparent. First, actual levels of things
that may cause ideological collective grievances
(such as income inequality) may be weakly cor-
relatedwith perceived grievance. In fact, converg-
ing social psychological research detail the way
oppressed groups internalize stereotypes that
justify their oppression,15,16 leading to an alter-
native explanation of why actual inequalities
may not predict likelihood of civil conﬂict—
the effect of inequality is likely moderated by
the perceived illegitimacy of such inequality.17
Second, MacCulloch’s analysis did not control
for potentially confounding factors, such as eth-
nicity or identiﬁcation with high- or low-status
groups.14 Thus, we cannot know whether rela-
tive economic status is itself a cause of support
for rebellion or instead a proxy for other poten-
tially important variables. In fact, focusing on
economic indicators leads to an incomplete test
of the hypothesis that people require individual-
level incentives to participate in collective
action.
Other potential selective incentives may in-
clude the maintenance or enhancement of in-
dividual status within the collective. Tropp and
Brown report research examining the impor-
tance of these types of incentives in the con-
text of participation in collective campaigns
for women’s rights in the USA.18 They found
that the more people believed participation
might enhance their own self-esteem or self-
importance, the more likely they were to ex-
press interest in and involvement in collec-
tive action. However, these measures might
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have conﬂated self-enhancement motives with
ideology. Many collective actions carried out
by women’s rights movements are speciﬁ-
cally designed to raise self-esteem of women.
Thus, a belief that participation will increase
self-esteem might actually be measuring ac-
cordance with the ideology of the women’s
movement rather than (or as well as) selective
emotional incentives to participate. This alter-
nate explanation of Tropp andBrown’s ﬁndings
is supported by other studies measuring partic-
ipation in a greater variety of collective actions
across cultures that show expected social re-
wards do not predict participation in collective
action.19,20
Empirical Evidence: The Collective
Commitment Hypothesis
There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest
that selective incentives may not be necessary
to motivate violent political action. To give an
extreme example, Jewish resistance in the War-
saw Ghetto during World War II emerged only
when deathwas deemed unavoidable.21 In such
a case it is difﬁcult to see how ﬁghting was
motivated by a cost–beneﬁt analysis as there
was nothing to win by ﬁghting. Current em-
pirical evidence for the collective commitment
(or parochial altruism) hypothesis is insufﬁcient,
although compelling. Research has linked indi-
vidually costly cooperation with a collective to
high levels of identiﬁcation with it.22,23 People
identify themselves on collective levels in ad-
dition to individual ones,24–27 and there is a
general tendency to act in ways that have col-
lective beneﬁts irrespective of individual-level
beneﬁts even when those collectives are mean-
ingless laboratory constructions.17,28 Identiﬁ-
cation with a collective is a reliable predictor
of protest participation,29 and support for po-
litical protest may indeed be fostered by per-
ceptions about collective rather than individual
economic and political circumstances.30–34
Although clearly important, this research
is not deﬁnitive for our purpose. Proponents
of the selective incentives argument do not
claim that collective identiﬁcation is unassoci-
ated with collective action; they merely claim
that collective identiﬁcation is insufﬁcient to
motivate individual participation in such ac-
tion. In addition, a plausible interpretation of
the above evidence is that the level of collec-
tive identiﬁcation might simply be a proxy for
vulnerability to informal social incentives that
encourage participation. In other words, to the
extent that a person identiﬁes highly with a
group, he or she is more likely to be sensitive
to informal selective incentives. Hence there is
little empirical evidence that supports the idea
that collective identiﬁcation is sufﬁcient to mo-
tivate participation in collective action without
the promise of selective incentives.
Study 1: Father versus Family
If decisions about political violence are based
more on moral than on instrumental consider-
ations, instrumentally irrelevant factors should
inﬂuence decision making. This experiment
tested that prediction.
Method
Seven hundred and twenty Palestinian adults
were recruited in 14 university campuses across
the West Bank and Gaza to participate in a
survey. Half of these participants were women
and half were members of Hamas or Pales-
tinian Islamic Jihad. Participants were asked
the extent to which scenarios were certainly
acceptable (coded “1”), somewhat acceptable
(coded “2”), somewhat unacceptable (coded
“3”), or certainly unacceptable (coded “4”). For
example:
What if a person wanted to carry out a bombing
(which some . . . call suicide attacks) against the
enemies of Palestine but his father becomes ill, and
his family begs the chosenmartyr to take care of his
father, would it be acceptable to delay the attack
indeﬁnitely?
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What if a person wanted to carry out a bombing
(which some . . . call suicide attacks) against the en-
emies of Palestine but his family begs him to delay
martyrdom indeﬁnitely because there was a sig-
niﬁcantly high chance the chosen martyr’s family
would be killed in retaliation, would it be accept-
able to delay the attack indeﬁnitely?
Results and Discussion
Participants were inclined to believe that an
indeﬁnite delay of a suicide attack to save the
entire family from probable death (mean [SD]
= 2.348 [1.186]) was more unacceptable than
an indeﬁnite delay of a suicide attack to look
after an ill father (2.047 [1.069]; z = −5.351,
P < 0.001; byWilcoxon signed rank test). Simi-
larly, a 1-month delay of a suicide attack to save
the entire family from probable death was rated
as more unacceptable (2.726 [1.14]) than a
1-month delay to look after an ill father (2.591
[1.106]; z = −2.483, P = 0.013; by Wilcoxon
signed rank test). Clearly, these results show that
when people are reasoning between duty towar
or to family, they are not making instrumental
decisions but rather decisions based on percep-
tions of moral obligations that can change as a
result of instrumentally irrelevant alterations in
context.
Study 2: Do Selective Incentives
Constitute Taboo Trade-offs?
To investigate the role of selective incentives
versus collective commitment more directly, we
examined whether ordinary people in a violent
intergroup conﬂict believe that it is permissible
or taboo to offer selective material incentives
to combatants. Clearly, for selective incentives
to motivate participation, the offer of such in-
centives should be permissible. If that were the
case, people should encourage measuring the
commitment of combatants along instrumen-
tal metrics, encouraging the use of material re-
wards to motivate participation. Alternatively,
if participation is motivated by parochial altru-
ism, ordinary people should regard material-
selective incentives for participation in violent
collective action as a “taboo trade-off”35 as it
entailsmeasuringmoral commitments along an
instrumental metric. Furthermore, if this were
the case, greater material incentives, which
make the taboo nature of the trade-off more
salient, should provoke stronger rejection of the
trade-off.6–9
Method
To test these alternate hypotheses, we ran an
experiment that was integrated in a survey of a
representative sample of 1266 PalestinianMus-
lim adults (51% women, 49% men; median
age = 34) living in the West Bank (63% of the
sample) and Gaza (37%). The survey was run
by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Sur-
vey Research and was conducted face-to-face
in the participant’s homes (for greater detail
of the survey methodology see www.pcpsr.org).
The survey included a range of questions deal-
ing with values, experiences under the Israeli
occupation, and the way participants reasoned
about political violence. To measure whether it
was permissible or taboo in Palestinian society
to think about material gains of involvement in
acts of violence against the Israeli occupation,
we asked,
In your view would it be acceptable for the family
of a martyr to request compensation in the amount
of JD (Jordanian Dinars) _________ after their son
carried out a martyrdom operation? Would it be
certainly acceptable, acceptable, unacceptable, or
certainly unacceptable?
We randomly varied between participants
the amount ofmoney requested in this scenario:
JD10,000, JD100,000, or JD1,000,000. To test
the effect of the experimental manipulation, we
scored participants’ responses from 1 (certainly
acceptable) to 4 (certainly unacceptable).
Results and Discussion
Across experimental conditions more than
90% of the sample regarded a request for
compensation, regardless of the amount, to be
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Figure 1. Mean ratings of how unacceptable it is for a martyr’s family to request ﬁnancial compensation
as a function of the amount of compensation requested. Error bars show SEM. Values in Jordanian Dinars
(JD).
unacceptable. This indicates that it is not nor-
mative to think about martyrdom in material
terms. Analysis of variance indicated a signif-
icant linear trend (JD10,000 < JD100,000 <
JD1,000,000) such that as the amount of ﬁ-
nancial compensation increased, so too did the
perception that the request was unacceptable;
F (1,1187) = 6.06, P = 0.014 (see Fig. 1).
These results are inconsistent with the selec-
tive incentives explanation but consistent with
the parochial altruism explanation for partici-
pation in violent collective action. Participants
appeared to regard the request for ﬁnancial
compensation in exchange for the sacriﬁce of
a martyr’s life as taboo. Moreover, as the mon-
etary amount requested increased so did dis-
approval ratings. However, alternative expla-
nations for these ﬁndings remain. First, the
wording of the question may have biased the
results somewhat as referring to martyrs and
martyrdom explicitly invokes a concept of sac-
riﬁce. Second, asmentioned earlier, it is possible
that selective incentives are nonmaterial goods,
such as reputation and status. It may be that,
in Palestinian society, participation in collective
political violence is motivated by nonmaterial-
selective incentives even as material-selective
incentives are taboo. Third, the answers that
people gave may be thought of as posturing
rather than reﬂecting “true” opinions. This is
a problem common to all studies of potential,
actual, or past combatants; participants aremo-
tivated to deny real motivations to themselves
and others and to substitute them. Put simply,
the narratives people construct about political
violence may simply not be true.
Study 3: An Indirect Test of
Selective Incentives versus
Parochial Altruism as Motivators
for Participation in Violent
Collective Action
Because direct investigation of motives to
participate in collective action is particularly
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vulnerable to posturing, we present an inves-
tigation of the relationship between value pri-
orities and participation in political violence.
Values are general beliefs about desirable end
states that represent motivational goals.36–38
Values constitute an excellent indirect means
of investigating the importance of different
types of motivations. For values to inﬂuence
an individual’s behavior, they must be ﬁrst
primed or activated and must also be of cen-
tral importance to that individual.39 Thus, if,
for instance, a positive relationship were found
between self-enhancement values (which in-
clude social power, authority, wealth, personal
success, and ambition)40 and participation in
political violence, we could suppose that (a)
participation or intentions to participate in col-
lective actions would indicate that selective in-
centives to participate are sufﬁciently salient
in the environment to prime self-enhancement
values and (b) that self-enhancement motives
disproportionately motivate participants, com-
pared to nonparticipating supporters. No rela-
tionship between self-enhancement values and
participation would imply either the absence of
selective incentive cues or their irrelevance to
decision making.
If, on the other hand, participation in vi-
olent collective action is driven by parochial
altruism, then participation would be a posi-
tive function of the salience and importance
of parochial incentives, such as security, tradi-
tion, and conformity, and a negative function
of universalism values, such as broadminded,
equality, and peace.40
Method
The research instrument was distributed via
an anonymous mailing to a random sample
of 3000 Jewish residencies in the West Bank
to ensure anonymity of responses. Although
many Jewish residents of the Israeli-occupied
West Bank moved there from Israel for ﬁnan-
cial reasons, the community as a whole, typi-
cally referred to as settlers, is politically active
with a history of involvement in nonstate polit-
ical violence.41 A self-addressed stamped enve-
lope accompanied the research instrument so
that respondents could return the questionnaire
anonymously. The response rate was 27% for
all questionnaires sent to the correct address,
resulting in a sample of 656 Jewish adults (63%
male, 37% female). Return rates have little im-
pact on the validity of responses provided that
the sample is representative of the population
on signiﬁcant dimensions.42,43 Our sample was
representative of the Jewish population of the
West Bank in terms of religious and political
identities.
Our dependent variables were willingness to
violently attack Palestinians or other Israelis
who were attempting to enforce a forced evac-
uation of settlements. Respondents were asked
to indicate whether they intended to engage in
each behavior in the event that their settlement
was to be dismantled in the context of a peace
agreement (coded: “0” unwilling or “1” willing
for each act). We regressed willingness to par-
ticipate on value priority scores, which were
measured using Schwartz’s Portrait Question-
naire.40 This questionnaire consists of 27 ques-
tions each asking about a speciﬁc value. Each
question is a portrait of an individual (for ex-
ample, “Being very successful is important to
him/her. He/she likes to impress other peo-
ple.”), and a respondent is asked to rate his
or her similarity to the portrait on a six-point
scale (from “very much like me” to “not at all
like me”). Scores for each speciﬁc marker of
different value types or themes were then av-
eraged to produce a scale. The individual val-
ues representing “universalism” (alpha= 0.78),
“benevolence” (alpha = 0.76), “parochialism”
(alpha = 0.80), and ‘self-enhancement” (al-
pha = 0.80) all formed reliable scales.
Results and Discussion
Reports of future intentions revealed a polit-
ically active sample. To act against the forced
evacuation of their settlement, over 10%of par-
ticipants (n = 67) reported a willingness to par-
ticipate in violent attacks against Palestinians
Ginges & Atran: Participation in Violent Political Action 121
and 6.4% (n = 42) were willing to participate
in violent attacks against Israelis. While only
a minority of Jewish residents were willing to
participate in violent attacks, extrapolating the
ﬁndings to a population approaching 250,000
indicates the seriousness of the issue. For ex-
ample, if we assume an adult population of
100,000, approximately 10,000 may be willing
to engage in violent attacks against Palestinians
in the event of forced evacuation and approxi-
mately 6400 to attack other Israelis under the
same conditions.
Logistic regressions showed no relationship
between self-enhancement scores and willing-
ness to attack Palestinians (Wald = 0.11, NS)
or Israelis (Wald = 0.6, NS) but showed a pos-
itive relationship between conservatism scores
and willingness to participate in acts of polit-
ical violence. For every one unit increase on
conservatism scores, the predicted odds of a
person being willing to violently attack Pales-
tinians increased by a multiplicative factor of
1.93 (Wald = 9.52, 95% conﬁdence interval
[CI] for Odds Ratio = 1.29–2.93, P < .01).
Similarly, for every one unit increase on con-
servatism scores, the predicted odds of a per-
son being willing to violently attack other Is-
raelis increased by a multiplicative factor of
1.97 (Wald = 7.18, 95% CI for Odds Ra-
tio = 1.2–3.23, P < .01). In other words, with
every unit increase on the conservative score,
the odds of participating in violent action are
almost doubled.
It appears that values representing collec-
tive incentives are salient in the context of de-
cisions to participate in collective actions and
that participants are disproportionately moti-
vated by such values. These results are strik-
ing, suggesting either that selective incentives
are not particularly important to participants
in some situations, such as those that underlie
seemingly intractable cultural or political con-
ﬂict, or at least that they are not incrementally
motivating with respect to participation in col-
lective actions within this community. Signiﬁ-
cantly, these ﬁndings have been recently repli-
cated in a survey of Palestinians living in the
West Bank where willingness to participate in
high-sacriﬁce actions to resist the Israeli oc-
cupation was negatively correlated with self-
enhancement values but positively correlated
with communal values.
General Discussion
Three studies carried out in the West Bank
and Gaza suggested that people do not partic-
ipate in violent political action in response to
individual-level selective incentives. In Study 1,
we showed that Palestinians tended to reason
about political violence in a noninstrumental
manner by showing more disapproval over a
delay of a martyrdom attack to rescue an en-
tire family than over a delay of a martyrdom
attack to take care of an ill father. In Study
2, we demonstrated that ordinary people re-
gard material-selective incentives for partici-
pating in acts of martyrdom as taboo. The
more money families requested in compensa-
tion for their son’s martyrdom, the more in-
tensely people disapproved of the request. In a
third study of Israeli settlers, recently replicated
by Nicole Argo with a Palestinian sample, self-
enhancement motives (such as power) were un-
related (or negatively related) to willingness to
participate in violent collective action. Instead,
participation in violent collective action seems
to be motivated by communal concerns; the
greater the priority given to communal values,
the more likely an individual was to be will-
ing to participate in violent collective action.
Such causes may of course be material; people
may ﬁght to defend an essential water resource.
However, aswe have shownpreviously, commu-
nal causes are often purely symbolic in nature,
involving sacred values.6
We might question whether this empirical
case study is relevant to other contexts, such as
Iraqi opposition to American occupation, in-
terethnic riots in Southeast Asia, or civil wars
in African countries. In some circumstances,
people might rebel as a function of immediate
or delayed selective incentives. However, we do
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argue that our ﬁndings demonstrate that par-
ticipation in collective political actions need not
be in response to selective incentives. People
will engage in costly and potentially deadly be-
haviors, they will be ready to kill and to die,
solely to further collective goals, regardless of
the presence of personal selective incentives.
These ﬁndings paint the picture of the
parochially altruistic political actor rebelling to
advance a cause in a way that is unrelated to
personal ambitions, or in a way that is evi-
dence of an abandonment of personal ambi-
tions. It appears that choices people make in
violent intergroup conﬂicts, from whether to
accept a compromise to whether individuals
commit themselves to violent collective action,
are bound by moral commitments to collective
interests.
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